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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' traditional patent system for pharmaceuticals, which
currently affords pharmaceutical innovators protection of their intellectual
property for several years, has been applauded for fostering innovation and
incentivizing firms to develop new and beneficial drugs and therapies with the
promise of market exclusivity to those firms for their patented drugs. Indeed,
U.S. firms, which develop drugs in a largely unregulated market, have been at
the forefront of developing cutting-edge therapies for the past several decades.'
However, the U.S. patent system is not without deficiency; instead, the
coveted exclusivity afforded to drug developers by patent protection often
inadvertently creates socially undesirable incentives for those developers. These
incentives, when pursued, contribute to the soaring costs of pharmaceuticals
and ultimately contribute to the rising and unsustainable cost of public health
care in the U.S.2 Specifically, the patent system incentivizes pharmaceutical
innovators to (1) create "me-too" 3 drugs (which hardly differ from other firms'
drugs that have already gained market approval and have proven to be lucrative)
and (2) make incremental changes to their own drugs, which have patents that
are nearing expiration, in order to prolong patent protection and thereby
preserve market exclusivity. In pursuing these incentives, developing firms
ultimately detract from the time and effort they would otherwise spend to
develop genuinely innovative therapies in the interest of pursuing these socially
suboptimal outcomes.
The socially suboptimal side effects of the patent system have contributedand continue to contribute-to the rising and unsustainable costs of
pharmaceuticals, which ultimately contribute to the rising and unsustainable
costs of health care in the U.S. Few would dispute the need to address these
rising costs, which continue to plague the United States' public health care
system. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
overall U.S. health expenditure grew by 3.8% in 2009, totaling $2.5 trillion for
the year. 4 This represents 17.9% of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP),
and an average of over $8,000 spent per person in 2009.5

1 See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
2

3

See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
AIDAN HOLIS & THOMAS POGGE, INCENTIVES

FOR GLOBAL HEALTH, THE HEALTH

4 (2008).
4 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Nat'1 Health

IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES AcCESSIBLE FOR ALL

Expenditure Data Sheet, https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf.
5 Id.
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Further, spending on pharmaceuticals accounted for no small portion of
total U.S. health care expenditure. In 2008, the U.S. spent $234.1 billion on
prescription drugs, more than double the total amount that the U.S. spent for
prescription drugs in 1999.6 This total in pharmaceutical spending accounted
for roughly 10% of total U.S. health care expenditures, which exceeded $2.3
trillion in 2010.7
By 2010, the growth in U.S. spending on pharmaceuticals had slowed, but still
8
grew by 2.3% from 2009 to total $307.4 billion in "the world's biggest market."
The stagnant U.S. economy, coupled with prohibitive unemployment, was likely
the reason for a deceleration in pharmaceutical spending growth.9 A stagnant
economy reinforces the fact that reduction in spending on pharmaceutical
products-specifically through the exploration of options for reformation or
supplementation of the traditional patent system-is just what the doctor
ordeied. A realization in savings on pharmaceutical expenditures could have
major positive implications for the overall national budget.
The U.S. has recently taken steps to decrease spending on-and improve
the effectiveness of-pharmaceuticals with the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA).o PPACA attempts to
rein in costs-while maintaining or improving the quality-of pharmaceuticals
with an increased focus on comparative effectiveness research (CER) for any
given innovative pharmaceutical.'
However, PPACA may not sufficiently address the problems that inhere in
the patent system's regulation of pharmaceuticals. Because part of the patent
system's inherent problem is that it offers little incentive to firms to develop a
pharmaceutical that is effective as compared to others already on the market, a
robust and radical remedy is required. PPACA, however, is neither robust nor
radical: instead, it places critical limits upon the use of comparative effectiveness
data (CER).12 Most notably, PPACA prohibits the Centers for Medicare and

6 Qiuping Gu et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, PrescriptionDrug Use Continues to
Increase: U.S. Prscnibtion Drug Datafor 2007-2008, 42 NCHS DATA BRIEF 1 (2010), http://www.

cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.htm.
7 Adara Beamesderfer & Usha Ranji, Kaiser Family Foundation, U.S. Health Care Costs,
KAISEREDU.ORG, http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Backgroun
d-Brief.aspx.

8 Bill

Berkrot, U.S. Drug Spending Slows; Hits $307 Billion in 2010: Report, THOMSON REUTERS

(Apr. 19, 2011, 1:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/19/us-drug-spending-idUST
RE7314G920110419.
9 Id
10 See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
12

See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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Medicaid Services (CMS) from using CER as the sole basis for determining that
CMS will not cover a particular drug for a Medicare enrollee.13 Sufficiently
addressing the problems inherent in the U.S. patent regime, which are
contributing to the costs and inefficiencies of the U.S. public health care system,
may require the implementation of a more radical solution.
The Health Impact Fund (HIF) is a revolutionary solution that could
considerably benefit American consumers by decreasing the price of
pharmaceuticals and encouraging the development, production, and market
entry of truly innovative drugs. The HIF is a proposal jointly crafted by Aidan
Hollis and Thomas Pogge.14 The proposal-The Health Impact Fund: Making
New Medicines Accessible for AI-calls for an international organization that
serves as an optional alternative to the traditional patent system for protecting
individual drugs in which countries may participate. 5 When applied in
participating nations, the HIF could help to significantly reduce the price of the
most effective and socially valuable pharmaceuticals to consumers.' 6 Under the
HIF, instead of applying for a traditional patent for a newly developed drug, a
pharmaceutical innovator could opt to register its drug with the HIF, and
thereby receive the intellectual property protection and reimbursement that the
HIF provides. 7 Should the U.S. adopt the HIF proposal, U.S. pharmaceutical
companies would have the option of registering their new pharmaceuticals with
the HIF, forgoing the protection of the traditional U.S. patent system' 8
However, the United States' adoption of the HIF proposal would create
several complications. Apart from whether the U.S. would adopt the HIF
proposal in the first place, the most important question upon adoption of the
HIF would be whether Medicare-a federal program, as well as "the largest
health maintenance organization in the Western world"19-would legally be able
to reimburse the value of drugs registered with the HIF program to the drugs'
innovators on behalf of Medicare enrollees. The HIF calls for the use of a
quality-adjusted life years (QALY) measurement to determine a drug's value,
and thus, to determine how much to reimburse the drug's developer for her
intellectual property. 20 Although some scholars argue that the U.S. is entering a
13 See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
14 HOLus & POGGE, supra note 3, at 83-89.
15
16
17
18

Id. at 1-2.
Id

Id
Id.

19 Bruce Patsner, Markeing Appval Versus Cost of New Medical Technologies in the Era of
Comparaive Effectiveness: CMS, Not FDA, Will be the Primay Player, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 38,

43 (2010).
20 See HoLus & POGGE, supra note 3, at 9.
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new era of comparative effectiveness-in which a drug's efficacy, as compared
to that of other, similar drugs, is more closely scrutinized 21-there is little hope
that the U.S. will embrace a comparative effectiveness evaluation system such as
the QALY measurement. This is due to a deep-rooted social opposition to the
use of standards, such as the QALY, which determine whether a drug will be
made available to individual consumers. This reaction has been codified in the
PPACA, which (as mentioned) restricts CMS's use of comparative effectiveness
data when making coverage decisions32 This restriction could very well bar
CMS from covering patients and reimbursing developers for drugs that have
been registered with the HIF and are therefore evaluated under the QALY
measurement of value.
As an alternative to adopting the HIF proposal nationwide, two possible
applications of HIF are worth considering: (1) participation of individual U.S.
states in the international HIF model, and (2) adoption of an intrastate version
of the HIF model within individual U.S. states. Individual states have more
freedom within the Medicaid program, which unlike Medicare, is not national
but statewide, to implement novel systems of third party payment for
pharmaceutical drugs. Further, because states are often required to meet certain
national standards without financial help from the federal government (i.e.,
unfunded federal mandates), states may have a stronger incentive to rein in the
costs of pharmaceuticals, as well as a persuasive argument for implementing
dramatic changes and novel systems. Finally, the implementation of novel
systems or radical changes within a single state-instead of nationwide-may
meet with far less Congressional and popular resistance. Therefore, certain
individual states may have a more realistic chance of achieving passage of
legislation approving the HIF model than would the federal government.
This Note first explores the traditional patent system, focusing on some of
its most critical failures. It then turns to recent efforts-both within Congress
and other government administrations-to correct the problems perpetuated by
the current patent system with the aim of improving the quality and decreasing
the cost of pharmaceuticals. The Note then explores the HIF proposal, as well
as an example of a U.S. state, Massachusetts, in which revolutionary health care
reform has been implemented with mixed success.
This Note determines that the recent efforts to rein in costs and increase
pharmaceutical effectiveness nationwide are steps in the right direction but are
See Richard S. Saver, The New Era of Comparative Efetiveness: Will Publc Health End Up left
Behind?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 437, 437 (2011) (arguing that "[a]s a result of health care reform,
medicine has entered a new era of comparative effectiveness").
22 Id. at 439; see also PaentProtection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
§ 6301(a) (2010).
21
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ultimately insufficient. It then determines that the HIF proposal, on the other
hand, could provide radical change and considerable benefit to U.S.
pharmaceuticals consumers. However, the Note concludes that adoption of the
HIF in the U.S.-at least, adoption without major caveats, the application of
which may ultimately render the HIF ineffective-is unlikely, largely because of
the adverse reaction the QALY measurement is likely to face among members
of Congress and the public. It is more likely that certain individual states (such
as those that are more politically liberal, like Massachusetts) may be able to
implement a statewide version of the HIF.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE CURRENT U.S. PATENT SYSTEM

The traditional pharmaceutical patent system is based upon the following
premise: in order to incentivize the innovation of new pharmaceuticals, one
must offer to a pharmaceutical company, which develops a new drug, a reward
for its effort spent developing its intellectual property?3 This reward has
developed as patent protection: the exclusive right to advertise and sell a
pharmaceutical, the product of one's intellect and effort, for a predetermined
This protection prevents competing firms from
period of time. 24
profiting from-a pharmaceutical company's
subsequently
reproducing-and
25
property.
intellectual
In many respects, the current U.S. system has been very successful: the
incentive created by patent protection has indeed encouraged innovation. 26
This is evidenced by the past decade, in which the U.S. led the world in
generating intellectual property that contributed to pharmaceutical
innovations. 27 It has been noted that the U.S.'s laissez faire policy in regulating
pharmaceutical prices "has caused the U.S. to be the world's primary profit
center for new medical innovations."28 By contrast, the U.K.-in which the
government exercises control over pharmaceutical costs-has inadvertently
created "a gap between new medical innovations being offered and what the
2 HOLLS & POGGE, supra note 3, at 83-89.
24 Id. at 83-84.
25 Id
26 INNOVATION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES: U.S. FIRMS COMPETING IN A NEW WORLD,
COLLECTED STUDIES, NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 222 (J.T. Macher & D.C. Mowrey eds.,
2008); see also HOLUS & POGGE, supra note 3, at 84.

27 Macher & Mowrey, supra note 26, at 222.
28 Seth D. Knocke, Incentivi!a Innovation: PharmaceuticalPiing in the United States and the United
Kingdom, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 177, 177 (2011).
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government system will reimburse, leaving U.K. residents without the latest
medical technology." 29 This suggests that the U.K.'s restriction upon patients'
pharmaceutical consumption, which results from state-imposed limitations
upon the reimbursement of pharmaceutical companies for their intellectual
property, has stifled robust pharmaceutical innovation and consumption in the

U.K.30
Further, data suggests that the United States' patent system, as part of the
general public health care system, promotes overall health. For example, it
provides widespread access to life-prolonging drugs: "the survival rate for
prostate cancer is 92% in the U.S., compared with 57% in Britain.... [A]n
American woman has a 97% chance of remaining alive for at least five years
after a breast cancer diagnosis, while in Britain, only 78% survive that long." 31
However, the U.S. patent system is no panacea for public health care:
although the U.S. has led the world in pharmaceutical innovation for the past
several years, the U.S. also outstrips other nations in health care spending. 32 In
2008, U.S. health care expenditure "was 16% of the gross domestic product"
(GDP), whereas the U.K.'s total health expenditure accounted for only 8.7% of
its GDP in 2008.33 The difference in spending, however, did not positively
correlate with life expectancy; the average life expectancies at birth for both
males and females in the U.S. in 2010 were lower (75.78 and 80.81 years,
respectively) when compared to the average life expectancies at birth for males
and females in the U.K. (77.7 and 81.9 years, respectively). 34 By 2009, the U.S.'s
health care expenditure had grown to 16.2% of its total GDP; only Malta spent
a larger portion of its GDP (16.5%) on health care expenditures.35
Pharmaceutical expenditure and benefit received in the U.S. closely mirror
the U.S.'s overall health care expenditure: in 2003, the average U.S. consumer
spent $700 on pharmaceutical products, and spending is on the rise.36 In 2008,
national prescription drug expenditure increased by 5.3%, and was expected to

Id
Id
31Rick' Kahler, Healthcare on the CriticalList, FINANCIAL PLANNING (Apr. 1, 2010), http://
29
30

www.financial-planning.com/fp-issues/

20 1

04/healthcare-on-the-critical-list-2666256-1.html.

32 Leonard J. Nelson, Rationing Health Care in Britain and the United States, 7 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 175, 179 (2011).
33 Id.
3 Id.
3s Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison:Health Expenditures,THE WORD FACTBOOK,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2225rank.html.
36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Drug Spending in OECD
Countries Up ly Nearly a ThirdSince 1998, According to New OECD Data (Aug. 6, 2005), http://www.

oecd.org/document/25/0,2340,en_2649-201185_34967193-1-1_1,00.htmi.
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grow another 5.2% in 2009 to $246 billion.37 Continued growth in spending is
projected over the next several years.38 Like its overall health care expenditure,
the U.S.'s pharmaceutical spending habit does not positively correlate with a
higher life expectancy.
Although the U.S. spent more per person on
pharmaceuticals in 2003 than any other OECD country spent,39 the U.S. boasts
an average life expectancy of 78.49 years, with forty-nine other countries
(including the United Kingdom, ranked thirtieth) with higher life expectancies."
Certain inherent features of the patent system can help to explain the
inefficiencies and high costs that currently plague the U.S. health care regime
without bringing many correlative benefits. 41 Under the traditional patent
system, firms that develop new pharmaceuticals can only reap the benefits of
the market exclusivity afforded to them by a patent if there is an efficient
market for the patented drug that is willing and able to pay the price the
monopoly-holding pharmaceutical company (largely alone) sets. 42 Thus, under
the auspices of the traditional patent system, the private for-profit
pharmaceutical companies tend to focus on developing drugs that target the
affluent, whom the companies reasonably anticipate will be willing participants
in the market for the new drugs.43 This tends to result in two phenomena: first,
a pharmaceutical company that has already received patent protection for a drug
will seek to extend the drug's patent protection by making "incremental
changes" to the drug shortly before the patent expires.44 Second, a private firm
is incentivized to develop new drugs that are similar to those already available.45
Similar to the incremental changes incentive, creating a drug that piggybacks off
of another is less time-consuming, less research-intensive, and more costeffective (as long as the new drug is sufficiently different from the first drug to
warrant separate patent protection).46 This phenomenon leaves the market
saturated with "me-too" drugs that target the affluent, while conditions that are
more common among those less wealthy go unaddressed. 47

37 See CMS, supra note 4.
Id
39 See OECD, supra note 36.
40 Central Intelligence Agency, Country Companion: Life Expectanq at Birth, THE WoRLD
38

FAcmOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.
html.
41 See HoLuis & POGGE, supra note 3, at 84-85.
42 Id. at 85-88.
43 Id
4 Id. at 4.

45 Id.
6 Id at 4-6.
47 Id
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Pharmaceutical companies do not always intentionally price the less affluent
out of the market. 48 In fact, the untargeted, would-be consumers represent an
untapped market for pharmaceutical firms, and their non-participation
represents market inefficiency.49 Price discrimination-the practice of selling
the same product at different prices based upon the different maximum prices
varying consumers are willing and able to pay for a drug-is difficult to
accomplish. As Hollis and Pogge explain, "[qharging different prices in
different countries can lead to parallel imports between countries-the
importation of inexpensive drugs from poor countries into rich countrieswhich results in some loss to the patentee of sales at high prices in the richer
countries."50 In addition to being priced out of the market for drugs that
pharmaceutical companies do have an incentive to develop (i.e., those drugs
that the affluent are willing and able to consume), the poor suffer an additional
injustice under the traditional patent system: "diseases among the poor attract
little or no pharmaceutical research." 5
Despite the U.S. system's inefficiencies, it represents a type of rationing,
which simply replaces another type (i.e., a state-regulated system). 52 Allowing a
governmental entity to determine the value of a medicine, and to base its
decision of coverage upon that determination, causes the unavoidable death of
at least some individuals who would otherwise have benefitted from the
medicine.53 The "rationing" of medication-determining which patients receive
which medicines-occurs in public health care regimes as well as in the free
market for pharmaceuticals: " '[u]nder highly centralized national health care,
the government inevitably makes cost-minded judgments about what types of
care are "best" for society at large, and the standardized treatments it prescribes
inevitably steal life-saving options from individual patients.' "54 However, it is
more palatable to the American consumer when that rationing occurs as a result
of individuals' market-based choices rather than at the institutional level.55

48 Id. at 84-85.
49 Id
50 Id. at 85.
51 Id. at 1.

52See Nelson, sapra note 32, at 185-86 (arguing that rationing of health care occurs both in
highly centralized health care regimes as well as in decentralized ones).
53 Id. at 178.
54Id. (quoting Editorial, Death Panels Revisited, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2010), http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052748703960804576120103417920260.html).
55Id. at 232.
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B. RECENT AND FORTHCOMING CHANGES: THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IN THE ERA OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

1. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

On March 23, 2010,

President Obama signed into law the Senate's "Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act" (PPACA).5 6 The Act represents the fusion of "separate
bills prepared by the Senate Finance and Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee, supplemented by a nearly 400 page long manager's
amendment adopted on the floor."57 The manager's amendment, attached to
the end of the Act as Title X, substantially alters or negates many of the
provisions that appear in the preceding titles.58 In addition to Title X, the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 further amends
PPACA.59 In order to demonstrate the relative impotency of PPACA (and to
describe its helpful aspects), discussion of pertinent sections of the PPACA
follows.
Section 300gg-17(a)(1) of the PPACA requires the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to "develop reporting requirements," to be utilized
by group health plans and health insurance issuers, that "improve health
outcomes" and "improve patient safety ... through the appropriate use of best
clinical practices, evidence based medicine, and health information
technology ... ."60 Subtitle G contains an "Access to Therapies Provision,"
which states that the "HHS shall not promulgate regulations that .. . interfere
with provider/patient communications regarding the full range of treatment
options, restrict the ability of health care providers to provide full disclosure of
patients of information relevant to treatment disclosures, [or] violate informed
PPACA further establishes a Center for
consent or ethical principles.. ."61
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation-to operate as part of CMS-in which
Congress vests "resources and flexibility to identify, develop, rapidly test and
encourage widespread adoption of innovative care and payment models, laying
the groundwork for a broader transformation of our healthcare system to one
that delivers better health care at lower costs," according to the CMS mission
statement. 62
56 Timothy S. Jost, Introduction to the PatientPtection andAffordable Care Act & the Health Care and
Education Recondiation Act of 2010, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5106, § 1.01 (LexisNexis Grp. 2010);
see also Patient ProtectionandAffordable Car Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 6301 (a) (2010).
5
58

Jost, supra note 56.
Id

5 Id

a 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(a)(1)(A), (C) (2010).
61 Jost, supra note 56, § 1.36[3].
62 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, Our Mission, http://innovations.cms.gov/abo
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Finally, Title VI of PPACA adds Part D-Comparative Clinical
63
According to the
Effectiveness Research-to the Social Security Act (SSA).
statute, the term "comparative clinical effectiveness research" is defined as
"research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical
effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and
items described in subparagraph (B)." 64 Subparagraph (B) states that
[t]he medical treatments, services, and items described in this
subparagraph are health care interventions, protocols for
treatment, care management, and delivery, procedures, medical
devices, diagnostic tools, pharmaceuticals (including drugs and
biologicals), integrative health practices, and any other strategies
or items being used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis
65
of, or prevention of illness or injury in, individuals.
Part IV establishes the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to
conduct and implement the patient-centered research described above to
benefit patients. 66 Section 1320e(c) states that
[t]he purpose of the Institute is to assist patients, clinicians,
purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health
decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of evidence
concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other
health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented,
diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed through research
and evidence synthesis that considers variations in patient
subpopulations, and the dissemination of research findings with
respect to the relative health outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and
appropriateness of the medical treatments, services, and items
67
described in subsection (a)(2)(B) [reproduced above].

ut-us/our-mission/index.html; see also 42 U.S.C. 5 1315(a) (2010) (establishing the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (2010); see alo Jost, supra note 56, § 1.57 (summarizing the provisions of
Part IV of the PPACA, which establishes the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(a)(2)(A) (2010).
Id. § 1320e(a)(2)(B).
66 Id. § 1320e(c).
65

67 Id.
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The Research Institute's Board of Governors is to be comprised of (1) the
Director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the
National Institute of Health (NIH) Director, and (3) seventeen members to be
appointed by the Comptroller General of the United States. 68 Those seventeen
members shall include three patient and consumer representatives; seven
physician and provider representatives; three representatives of private payers;
three representatives of drug, device, and diagnostic manufacturers; one
representative of quality improvement or health services researchers, and two
representatives of the federal or state government. 69 Any board member of the
Institute should resolve any conflict of interest, either real or apparent, as
defined in § 1320e(a). 70 Finally, § 132 0e-1 places limitations upon the use of the
comparative clinical effectiveness research described in § 1320e. 71
In an attempt to control runaway costs, PPACA establishes the New
Independent Medicare Payment Advisory Board, which will "impose Medicare
payment cuts if Medicare costs are otherwise not controlled." 72 The Board's
authority "extend[s] beyond the Medicare program to allow it to make
recommendations to the President and Congress (and, indirectly, to the states)
as to measures that can be taken to slow the growth of non-federal
expenditures." 73
Title VI of PPACA "amends 42 U.S.C. 1395w- 2 7 to .. . authorize
intermediate sanctions where a Medicare Advantage plan ... fails to comply
with marketing restrictions, or employs or contracts with an individual who
engages in marketing violations."74 Further, Title VI amends Title XI of the
Social Security Act of 1965 (SSA) to add the Reporting of Information Relating
to Drug Samples, which requires that manufacturers and distributors "submit to
HHS... the identi[t]y and quantity of drug samples requested and distributed
during the [preceding] year" on an annual basis.75 Like the marketing restriction
provision, the purpose of this provision seems to be to rein in costs through the
control of-or at least monitoring of-the amount of pharmaceutical
companies' advertising, be it directly to consumers or to prescribing physicians.

Id. § 1320e(o.
Id.; see also Jost, supra note 56, S 1.57[2] (identifying the criteria for the composition of the
Board of Governors for the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute).
70 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(h)(4) (2010); see aloJost,supra note 56, § 1.57[2].
68
69

71

42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1 (2010).

Jost, supra note 56, § 1.39.
73 Id.
74 Id. 1.45[2].
75 Id. § 1.54[1].
72
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Subtitle D delineates states' obligations under the PPACA. 76 Subtitle D
requires each state to establish an American Health Benefit Exchange
(exchange), as well as a Small Business Health Options exchange (SHOP) by
January 1, 2014.77 A state may apply for a federal grant to facilitate the state's
establishment of an exchange; grants may be awarded until January 1, 2015,
after which "exchanges must be self-sustaining through charging assessments or
user fees to health insurers."78 States may collaborate in order to create and
offer regional exchanges, provided they obtain approval from HHS.79
"Exchanges may contract with the state Medicaid agency or with 'eligible
entities' that have relevant experience but are not health insurers to carry out
certain exchange functions."80
2. Where We Are Now. Scholarsb 's Perspective. Current scholarship offers
mixed reports about the ability of the U.S.'s evolving health care regime,
codified in PPACA's provisions, to exact the purposes for which it was enacted.
"The PPACA represents perhaps the biggest change to Medicaid in the
program's history."s' Part of the ongoing change evident in the PPACA
legislation could be due to a greater emphasis on comparative effectiveness: that
is, increased focus on (1) how a new therapy compares to other, existing
therapies for a particular illness and (2) whether the new therapy produces
benefits that outweigh its costs. 82 On the other hand, perhaps the federal
government should act as the regulator of pharmaceutical costs. 8 3
Emphasis upon comparative effectiveness was codified in the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA), which "included an
appropriation of $1.1 billion to fund CER allocated among the Department of
Health and Human Services, the National Institutes of Health, and the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)."84 The Act established the
Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research to
"coordinate CER efforts at the federal level." 85 Although the PPACA built
76 Id. § 1.17.

77 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2010); see alsoJost,supra note 56, § 1.17[1], [2].
78 Jost, supra note 56, § 1.17[1].
79 42 U.S.C. § 18031(0(1) (2010).
8 Jost, supra note 56, § 1.17[2].
81 Id. § 1.37.
82 Saver, supra note 21, at 445; see also Patsner,supra note 19, at 42 (arguing that CMS's rising
prominence in the drug approval and marketing process will foster increased emphasis on
comparative effectiveness).
83 See Nelson, supra note 32, at 178 (quoting Editorial, Death Panels Reiited,WALL ST. J., Dec.
29, 2010).
84 Saver, supra note 21, at 438.
85 Id
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upon ARRA's efforts to fund CER, it also called for the replacement of the
Federal Coordinating Council with an entity largely controlled by private
86
interests, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCOR Institute).
The establishment of a privately controlled institute represents a limitation on
the federal government's power to wield comparative effectiveness
information,87 as will be explored in the Analysis section below. Further, as a
result of Congressional debates prior to the passage of PPACA, which raised
fears of rationing and death panels, the final version of PPACA significantly
restricts the use of CER.88 PPACA "prohibits the Medicare program from
making coverage decisions 'solely on the basis' of CER." 89 When Medicare
does consider CER as a factor affecting coverage, "Medicare cannot use the
evidence to assert that some treatments are less effective because they primarily
90
Finally, Medicare
help patients with an allegedly lower quality of life."
"cannot use CER in a manner 'that treats extending the life of an elderly,
disabled, or terminally ill individual as of lower value' than the needs of other
patients." 9'
Apart from public health care, PPACA does not directly regulate private
health insurers' implementation of CER.92 However, that does not mean that
private pharmaceutical firms will be unaffected by PPACA. 93 Since CMS is the
single largest payer for pharmaceuticals in the world (CMS covers roughly 40%
of all prescriptions in the U.S.),94 it has significant bargaining power with
pharmaceutical firms, which allows it to negotiate for competitive prices on
pharmaceuticals.9 5
The statutory shift toward funding and incentivizing CER has placed CMS
in a position to reduce the costs and increase the effectiveness of the
pharmaceuticals it covers. 96 CMS has traditionally been a mere financer of
pharmaceutical products, while the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has

86 Id. at 438-39.
87

Id

88 Id. at 439.
89 Id
90 Id.

Id
93 Id.
92

94 Patsner, supra note 19, at 72.
9s Id. at 72-73.
96 See id. at 42 (arguing that CMS's decision on whether and how much it is willing to pay for a
medical product or service is just as important, perhaps more important, than FDA's decision to
allow the product or service on the market).
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been the primary evaluator of new drugs.97 As such, the FDA was concerned
primarily with whether a new drug was safe for consumption, and rarely
considered whether a drug was comparatively more effective than others
already on the market.98 CMS, on the other hand, has begun to take a more
active role in the evaluation of new drugs with an eye toward their comparative
effectiveness.99 This, CMS hopes, will result in cost control, as it refuses to
cover pharmaceuticals that are neither more effective nor cheaper than others
Because CMS is the single largest consumer of
already available. 00
pharmaceuticals in the U.S. market, it has significant bargaining power with the
pharmaceutical industry. This will result in the development of drugs that are
not only safe and effective, but that are also more effective or cheaper (or both)
than their predecessors.o' However, CMS could be limited in the efficiency
and cost-savings that it can achieve because of a deep-seated, cultural fear of the
rationing of health services and medicines:
[E]fforts at cost control and payment based on purported
comparative criteria have been criticized repeatedly when it
appeared that patients were denied access to valuable, proven
medical therapy that actually offered value for the money or a
comparative advantage over existing therapy simply because
private carriers did not want to pay for it.102
Other scholars, cognizant of the same cultural fear of socialized medicine and
rationing, are less optimistic that CMS will be able to achieve meaningful cost
reform in pharmaceutical spending and efficiency.103
C. THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND

1. HIF Summary. Proposed by Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, The Health

Impact Fund.- Making New Medianes Accessible for All (HIF), seeks to remedy the
market inefficiencies of the traditional patent system and decrease the cost of
pharmaceuticals to all consumers. 104 The HIF is a "pay-for-performance
9 Id at 42-49.
98 Id. at 45-49.
99 Id. at 40-44.

10 Id at 56-59.
101 Id. at 42-45.
102 Id. at 64.

103 See Nelson, supra note 32, at 223-24 (quoting Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medican
Decisions, Transparenyand Pubc Trust,79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2010)).
104 HoLus & POGGE, supra note 3, at 1-2.
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scheme," which would supplement, rather than replace, the patent system. 05
Under this scheme, a pharmaceutical company would have the option either to
exercise its traditional intellectual property rights by seeking patent protection
for a newly developed drug, or to register that drug with the HIF instead. 0 6 A
firm's decision to register one drug with the HIF would not affect its freedom
to seek traditional patent protection for another drug later; a firm's participation
in the HIF system would be completely optional with each newly developed
drug. 0 Registration of a drug with the HIF would require the firm to offer the
drug to all consumers at a price "near the average cost of production and
distribution." 08 The firm would later receive proportional reimbursement from
the HIF for its drug based upon how valuable the HIF determines the drug to
be in comparison to all other registered drugs during a specific period of
time. 0 9 This reimbursement would come from funds contributed to the HIF
by "partner countries that agree to support [the HIF]."11o
2. Measuring Health Impact. The HIF will determine the value of a particular
drug by gathering data from the drug's consumers.'
This data will be used to
calculate the number of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) the drug has
contributed to its consumers through its therapeutic effects.112 The QALY
measurement places a higher value on a year of perfect health than a year of
imperfect health; therefore, in calculating a drug's QALY rating, a year of
perfect health would be ascribed a value of one, and a year of imperfect health
would be ascribed a value between zero and one."13
Several nationalized health care regimes, including the U.K.'s National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), already use a cost-perQALY-like formula when determining which therapies the state will cover for
its participants.1 4 Essentially, the cost-per-QALY formula is a cost-benefit
analysis. When making coverage decisions, NICE considers several factors
when calculating the cost of a proposed therapy, including "all direct medical
costs, cost of adverse side effects associated with treatment, savings due to
prevention or alleviation of the disease in question, and future costs related to
105
106
107

Id
Id.
Id. at 1.

108 Id
109 Id
110

Id. at 4.

M11
Id. at 9.

Id
Id. at 28.
114 See Nelson, supra note 32, at 178 (describing NICE's cost-effectiveness approach to making
coverage decisions for patients in the U.K.).
112
113
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the treatment of disease.""15 NICE then compares that cost to the therapy's
expected QALY.1I6 For example, a QALY calculation might look like this:
[Consider an individual . .. who will die unless she chooses
either radiation or surgery. Radiation guarantees five additional
years of life, with a quality adjustment of 0.8, and thus confers a
QALY benefit of 4. Surgery is associated with a 20% risk of
death; for those who do not die, however, it gives eight additional
years of life in full health. Surgery thus confers a QALY benefit
of 6.4 (an 80% chance of achieving an 8 QALY benefit)."'
Similarly, this sort of cost-benefit analysis occurs in the U.S.'s private sector
when insurance companies determine whether to cover a proposed therapy for
a particular policyholder.' 8 The allocation of "scarce resources" within a
particular society have been described as "tragic choices.""19 " '[Tragic
choices', i.e, rationing decisions through public and transparent processes that
result in the suffering and death of specific persons, exacerbate social tensions.
Thus, societies inevitably try to conceal the conflict in values to avoid the
appearance of making a 'tragic choice.' "120 Americans generally accept the
making of tragic choices, i.e., rationing, in the private sector, because its
occurrence can be attributed to the forces of free market capitalism.121 Many
Americans, however, find it particularly unpalatable when the Government
engages in the same cost-benefit analysis; they find it to be a blatant,
unwarranted allocation of resources.122
Under the HIF, the more years of the highest possible level of health a drug
contributes to a particular patient, the higher the drug's QALY rating will be.123
Further, the larger the pool of patients who benefit from a certain drug, the
higher the QALY rating of the drug will be.124 Theoretically, therefore, the HIF

11s Arti Kaur Rai, Raioning Though Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Efeeiveness Anaysis in Health
Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1049 (1997).

116 Id. at 1049-50.
117 Id. at 1050.
118 See Nelson, supranote 32, at 180 (recognizing that "some economists would define rationing

to include allocation of health care services through both the market and political processes").
119 Id. at 185 (citing GUIDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICEs 31-50 (W.W.

Norton & Co. 1978)).
121

Id
Id

i2

Id. at 183-85.

120

123 See HolLIS & POGGE,
124

supra note 3, at 28.

Id
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scheme creates an incentive for firms to create drugs that provide the highest
quality of life to the largest number of patients.125 It is unclear whether the HIF
would provide a different weighting to life years gained for patients of different
ages.

Critics of the QALY measurement "argue that the quality of life cannot be
determined on the basis of mathematical terms . . . ."126 Further, critics contend
that a decisionmaker's process of determining whether to make a therapy
available based upon a cost-per-QALY cost-benefit analysis "creates obstacles
for patients who are willing to receive the drug, especially those who can afford
the cost of the treatment." 27
3. Funding. Hollis and Pogge suggest two types of funding for the HIF: (1) a
state can opt to become a member of the HIF by committing to make prestructured payments, or (2) states and non-state actors alike can make
"unstructured payments into the HIF at any time." 28 States that commit to
membership in the HIF would be responsible for contributing a predetermined
percentage of its gross national income (GNI), calculated annually, to the HIF
for a predetermined incentive period.129 The authors suggest that this period
should be roughly twelve years. 30 A period of this length would reassure the
pharmaceutical industry that reward incentive funds would be available during
the most expensive stage of research and development for a drug, namely the
clinical trials during the few years prior to market clearance.131
4. Reimbursement. Reimbursement from the HIF to a firm will depend on (1)
the QALY rating of the drug compared to other HIF-registered drugs for a
particular year and (2) the amount of money that member countries have
invested in the HIF for that particular year.132 The use of QALY measurement
for determining a drug's value-and therefore, a firm's proportion of
reimbursement-gives firms an incentive to ensure that patients use their
pharmaceuticals properly, so that those patients can receive the highest
therapeutic effect possible. This will also increase the QALY rating of the
firm's drug. 33

125

Id

126 See Sonsy Pulikotil Rajan, Comparative Efectiveness Research in the United States, 10

J.

INT'L Bus.

& L. 431, 437 (2011).
127 Id. at 437-38.
128 See HoLUs & POGGE, supra note 3, at 43.
12 Id. at 43-44.
130 Id
131 Id

132 Id. at 13-14.
133 Id. at 6.
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D. HEALTH CARE REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS

In 2006, the Massachusetts legislature succeeded in passing substantial
reform to its public health care regime.M These reform measures include a
mandate that all Massachusetts residents carry insurance coverage, as well as
government subsidies for health insurance, which seek to ensure the
affordability of the obligatory insurance. 135 Employers with eleven or more
employees are required to provide health insurance, or otherwise to pay a "Fair
36
The
Share" contribution which may not exceed $295 annually per employee.
legislation also creates a Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector through
137
which individuals and small businesses can purchase health insurance.
Further, the legislation establishes the Commonwealth Care Health Insurance
Program, which offers sliding-scale subsidies for health care insurance to
residents who earn up to 300% of (or three times) the federal poverty level, and
provides fully-subsidized health care for those earning up to 150% of the
poverty level.' 38 The expansion of MassHealth extends Medicaid coverage to
children whose guardians earn up to 3 0 0 % of the federal poverty level, and
enrollment caps on existing Medicaid programs for adults have also been
elevated.' 39 Further, Massachusetts' health care plan calls for a merger between
individual and small-group insurance markets, after a legislation-mandated study
projected that such a merger would raise the cost of premiums for small
employers by about 1.5%, but would also lower the average cost of premiums
to individuals by 15%.140 The legislation further replaces the "Uncompensated
Care Pool" with the "Health Safety Net Trust Fund."141 Money from this fund
is to be utilized-along with Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital
Funds-to reimburse hospitals for emergency services rendered to uninsured
patients.142
Funding for the Massachusetts health care reform program comes from
existing sources-the federal Medicaid program, as well as a "redistribution of
existing funding"-and additional contributions from employers and "General
134 Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Massachusetts
Health Care Reform Plan - An Update, 1 (June 6, 2007), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/74
94-02.pdf.
s Id
136 Id.
137 Id.
138

1
140
141
142

Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
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Fund revenues."1 43 The Massachusetts legislature determined that "minimum
creditable coverage" includes "preventive and primary care, emergency services,
hospitalization benefits, ambulatory patient services, mental health services,"
and significantly, "prescription drug coverage."'"
Massachusetts' health care reform initiative has met with mixed success.1 45
On one hand, almost all of Massachusetts' residents now carry health insurance:
"[m]ore than 98[/o] of Massachusetts' residents now have insurance, including
99.8[/o] of all children, making Massachusetts' rate of uninsured the lowest in
the United States."' 46 Further, "[a]bout 77[%] of private companies are
providing health insurance to their employees, compared to 70 [%] before the
law was passed ... ."147 However, while the law has increased the number of
insured, as well as the number eligible for government subsidies, the law has not
succeeded in reducing costs to insurance policy holders.148 "Private spending
per member grew by 15.5[/o] on average between 2006 and 2008. Meanwhile,

average premiums for full insurance increased 12.2[%] from 2006 to 2008,
according to the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy."' 49
However, support for the legislation remains vigorous: "[t]wo out of three
adults in the state support the law, while 88[/o] of doctors say it improved, or
did not affect, the quality of care, per the BCBS survey."s 0
Those opposing the Massachusetts reform measures indicate that individual
policy holders have largely carried the financial burden of the law's enactment:
"[t]he median health insurance premium for a policy holder in Massachusetts
was $442 in 2009, a 21 [%] jump from 2005. Meanwhile, employers' share of
5
Additionally, the number of
premiums fell in the same time period."s'
Massachusetts residents who filed for bankruptcy due to medical expenses
increased by more than 33% between 2007 and 2009.152

143

Id

144

Id

145 Huma Khan, Has Mitt Romney's Massachusetts Health Care Law Worked? ABC NEWS BLOGS
(May 12, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/has-mitt-romneys-massachuset
ts-health-care-law-worked/.
146 Id
147 Id
148 Id
149 Id.
150 Id

Id
Id. (citing David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, Medical
Bankruptcy in Massachusetts: Has Health Reform Made a Difference?, 124 AM. J. MED. 224, 224-28
(2011)).
151

152
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III. ANALYSIS
A. A NEW ERA OF COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS?

While current scholarship offers mixed reviews about whether the United
States has truly moved into an era of comparative effectiveness,' 5 3 directives
have been codified in the PPACA order to ensure higher-quality health
results,154 which should have positive implications for the cost and quality of
pharmaceuticals. Section 3 0 0gg-17(a)(1) of the PPACA is exemplary: although
this section does not directly affect the patenting of pharmaceuticals that are
approved by the FDA, the section does directly affect a payer's or insurer's
decision of whether to cover a particular drug.'55 Because the section calls for
the HHS to develop reporting requirements that provide payers and insurers
with improved information regarding how "clinical practices" compare with
one another, these payers will theoretically be better positioned to offer to their
insured only the most effective and least expensive treatments. Cheaper and
more effective treatments might in turn incentivize pharmaceutical companies
to develop and produce drugs that are truly innovative (rather than "me-too"
drugs), or to offer drugs similar to those already available at a lower price.
At first blush, the Access to Therapies provision may seem to cut against the
goals of comparative effectiveness: it appears to allow patients to choose
treatment options other than the most cost-effective, continuing to foster
doctor-patient "communications regarding the full range of treatment
options." 56 However, patients are likely to make the most cost-effective
decisions for themselves based on the resources available to them and how
much value they place on the health benefits associated with each proffered
therapeutic option. Therefore, the more information that is available to each
patient, the more likely he will be to make a rational cost-benefit analysis,
leading to a collective trend of increased use of the most cost-effective
treatment. This sharply contrasts with the traditional FDA regime, under which
comparative effectiveness data is largely unavailable.' 57
Title VI of PPACA's amendment to 42 U.S.C. 1395w-27 suggests that one
of PPACA's tools for cutting costs is restricting faulty information from

See Saver, supra note 21, at 437-38 (addressing the optimism and the concern surrounding
comparative effectiveness research).
14 See Jost, supra note 56, § 1.04[9] (listing the different reporting requirements established in
the PPACA).
153

155 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(a)(1) (2010).

156 Jost, supra note 56, § 1.36[3].
157Patsner, supra note 19, at 41-42.
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reaching consumers.158 In other words, marketing restrictions were put in place
to keep consumers from making treatment decisions based on skewed or biased
advertising, which may lead to less effective treatment decisions than might
otherwise be made, while lining the pockets of the drug manufacturer. 5 9 If the
enforcement of marketing restrictions is a goal of the PPACA, then it is a goal
harmonious with the HIF proposal: a pharmaceutical company that registers a
drug with the HIF may have a decreased incentive to advertise its product to
consumers since the profit that the company realizes comes not from sales, but
from the health impact of the drug, as measured by the HIF.160 However, a
pharmaceutical company's incentive to advertise would not be reduced to zero
under the HIF. Since the company's reimbursement will depend in part upon
how many consumers of the drug realize a health benefit,161 the company will
necessarily want as many consumers as possible to purchase and use the drug.

Despite PPACA's advancements-and despite CMS's ability to bargain for
higher quality and lower costs for the pharmaceuticals it chooses to cover' 6 2 there is significant evidence that the U.S. has a collective resistance to the idea
of institutions such as CMS basing its decision to cover a particular drug upon
its own judgment that the drug's benefits outweigh its costs.1 63
B. APPLICATION OF THE HIF IN THE UNITED STATES

The HIF proposal has several positive implications for the developing
world, but those implications will remain largely unaddressed in this Note.
Arguably, the developing world stands to gain the most from the correction of
the patent system's deficiencies discussed above (namely, the pricing-out of the
poor for existing drugs and the lack of incentives for pharmaceutical companies
to develop drugs to address conditions that largely affect the poor).'1
The
benefits that U.S. consumers stand to gain may be less evident. In light of the

158 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-116(f)(2) (2010) (amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, tit. VI, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)).
159 Id.

16o See HoLus & POGGE, supra note 3, at 13 (noting that "[t]he essence of the HIF mechanism
is that innovators are rewarded in proportion to the measurable net health impact of their
innovations").
161

Id. at 29.

Patsner,supra note 19, at 43.
Nelson, supra note 32, at 185; see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. The
resistance has also been codified in PPACA. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, tit. VI,
5 6301(c), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320e); see also Saver,
supra note 21, at 439.
164 HoLUiS & POGGE, supra note 3, at 18.
162 See
163 See
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ever-growing cost of health care in the U.S., the HIF offers an alternative to the
patent system and may allow pharmaceutical companies to offer their drugs at
lower prices while still realizing economic gain for their intellectual property.165
A major complication that the HIF proposal does not address is the
incorporation of third party payers for prescription drugs. There are a variety
of ways in which consumers worldwide-whether aided by their government or
not-finance the pharmaceuticals they consume.
In many developing
countries, consumers pay a substantial amount of the full price out-of-pocket
for pharmaceuticals they consume.166 In these countries, there is no public
safety net in place for those who cannot afford essential medicines, and access
to medicine is, therefore, very limited.167
However, most countries in the developed world implement very different
systems for financing patients' pharmaceuticals, which involve a third party
payer.168 This third party payer can range from a number of entities: a private
insurer, the national government, or a combination of the two.1 69 The HIF
proposal fails to address the way in which third party payers will fit into its
scheme; it appears, however, that application of the HIF would be more
complicated when utilized alongside a third party payment system than when
utilized alongside a direct payment system. For example, in a direct payment
system, the state presumably would pay into the HIF, and then participating
firms would offer their pharmaceutical innovations to that state's citizens at the
cost of production of the drug.170 Perhaps then, the at-cost payments that the
consumers make for their prescriptions would be made to the pharmacy, which
would keep a portion to cover its costs and then pass along the rest of that
payment to the drug's developing firm.
However, under the U.S. third party payment system, the HIF process
would work slightly differently. Currently in the U.S., most prescription drug
users do not pay out-of-pocket for the prescriptions they have filled, but
165Id. at 84-85, 91-92.
166RAMESH GOVINDARAJ, MICHAEL R. REICH & JILLIAN C. COHEN, WORLD BANK HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT NETWORK, WORLD BANK PHARMACEUTICALS 8-9 (2000), http://siteresources.

worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-10956981401
67/Govindaraj-WBPharmaceutical-whole.pdf
167Id. at 9-11 (discussing inadequate government regulatory capacity and inadequate access to
essential drugs as two of the most important issues regarding developing countries' struggle to
achieve pharmaceutical industry stability).
168See MILTON SILVERMAN ET AL., BAD MEDICINE: THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG INDUSTRY IN THE
THIRD WORLD 229 (1992) (discussing the inadequacies of existing safety nets in third world
nations).
169 Id
170 HOLLIS & POGGE, Ssapra note 3, at 9.
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employ a third party, such as a private insurer or a governmental program (such
as Medicare or Medicaid), to reimburse the provider of the drug on the patient's
behalf.171 Of course, third party coverage is rarely unlimited; patients may face
coverage limits or they may be required to contribute a co-payment.172
Presumably, upon opting into the HIF, the U.S. would make an initial payment
to the HIF as a contribution to the HIF's future pay-for-performance
reimbursements to pharmaceutical firms.173 The U.S. would also act as a third
party payer to the pharmacy from which a patient received his medicines, a
portion of which would subsequently go to the drug's manufacturer. Thus, the
federal government would effectively pay twice for the same treatment: once as
an up-front payment into a fund held in escrow, which would later be divvied
up by the HIF based on the effectiveness of each treatment, and then again as
an at-cost payment directly to the pharmaceutical company that produced the
drug. Because the federal government would effectively be making two
payments, the HIF may not result in cost savings in the U.S. market.
Aside from administrative complications, uncertainties about the perceived
value of the HIF proposal remain. More specifically, the contentions raised by
measuring one's quality of life in mathematical terms might be more
pronounced in the U.S., where citizens tend to value individual liberties over
social equality. However, if the HIF is applied in the U.S., the fact that a
particular drug's cost-per-QALY ratio is not high enough to warrant sufficient
reimbursement from the HIF would not bar the drug's innovator from
exercising his patent rights and offering the drug for sale on the open market.174
Therefore, patients who are willing and able to pay for a drug with a QALY
rating too low to be covered under and reimbursed by the HIF would still be
able to purchase the drug if it was offered for sale on the open market.
Even if the average number of additional years that a therapy provides could
be determined with some certainty, the quality of those additional years is highly
subjective. Further, it is likely that, if the HIF were in fact implemented in the
U.S., there would be significant reaction against its QALY measurement
method for determining a drug's value and reimbursing pharmaceutical
companies for their intellectual property registered with the HIF. This is
because the QALY measurement is much like the CER standard, which has

"7 THE HEALTH STRATEGIES CONSULTANCY, LLC, FOLLOW THE PILL: UNDERSTANDING THE
U.S. COMMERCIAL PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 14 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/rx

drugs/upload/Follow-The-Pill-Understanding-the-U-S-Commercial-Pharmaceutical-Supply-Chai
n-Report.pdf.
172

Id

173 See HoLuIs & POGGE, supra note 3, at 43-44.
174 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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been incorporated into the PPACA with strict limitations upon its scope of
implementation.
Because the HIF would significantly reduce inter-firm competition,
pharmaceutical companies could benefit from decreased spending on
advertising its products and pursuing litigation against other firms.s75 This
might increase the appeal of the HIF to the pharmaceutical industry, making it
more feasible in the U.S. market.
Because the HIF calls for generous investment in gathering data about
registered drugs, implementation of the HIF in the U.S. could help to solve the
problem of the lack of information, which must be resolved in order to identify
and deploy the most effective treatments." 6 In order for prescribers to
prescribe-and payers to cover-the most cost-effective pharmaceuticals, they
must have access to information comparing pharmaceuticals to one another.
The traditional patent system does not foster access to this information; instead,
manufacturers conduct clinical trials for their own products, which often
proffer outcomes that do not reflect the drug's effectiveness for the general
population. 77 The HIF's proposed globally comprehensive database could
foster more centralized, more inclusive, and less biased information about a
Further, this
drug's value based upon prescriber and patient feedback.
information would reflect the effect of a particular drug upon a broad range of
real-world patients.
For the HIF to be an effective solution to the lack-of-information issue,
several different pharmaceuticals that target the same illness would need to be
registered. If one of these proved to be a significantly more effective treatment
for most or all patients than any other treatments, then that drug's
manufacturer would receive a significantly greater portion of reimbursement
funds from the HIF. This may prompt the manufacturer's unsuccessful
competitors to withdraw their similar products from the program and perhaps
attempt to exercise their traditional patent protection rights on the free market.
This use of the HIF, theoretically, could result in more comparative data being
made available to consumers about several pharmaceutical treatment options

175 See HOLUS & POGGE, supra note 3, at 6-7.
176 See Rajan, supra note 126, at 436 (stating that "CER in the US must first involve

consolidation of all studies, clinical trials, post market surveillance and the like carried out in a
therapy area for a specific disease condition. Second, it must apply the result of the studies to
determine the value afforded by various treatment options available in the market. Third, it must
weed out treatment options that are not beneficial to the patient population as a whole."); see also
Saver, supra note 21, at 442-43 (discussing the need for randomized, controlled trial (RCT) data to
"reflect real world circumstances").
177 See HoLus & POGGE, supra note 3, at 29-30.
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for a particular illness. Alternatively, it could result in the most universally
effective drug being made available to consumers through the HIF-again,
assuming sufficient participation of pharmaceutical companies in the first place.
Competing and comparable drug therapies that treat the same illness should
not be confused with the "me-too" drugs that plague the patent system, which
the HIF seeks to disincentivize. Standards would be set in place within the HIF
system, which would bar firms from registering drugs with the HIF that are too
similar to drugs already registered. 78 This is likely to raise two issues: (1)
windfall profits for a firm that develops a wildly successful therapy and enjoys
market exclusivity for the therapy under the HIF, and (2) disagreement-and
possibly litigation-between the HIF and private firms over what constitutes a
sufficiently dissimilar pharmaceutical therapy. Although adoption of the HIF in
the U.S. could bring about cost savings and beneficial innovation in the
pharmaceutical market, the NIF's implementation raises complex legal and
logistical issues.
C. OTHER NATIONAL OPTIONS?

Because the QALY measurement for a drug's value is likely to be
controversial if the HIF is applied in the U.S., it may be prudent to consider
other alternatives that address the patent system's deficiencies yet are unlikely to
face similar resistance in the U.S. market. CMS's role in the approval process of
new pharmaceuticals-and the growing significance of its decision to cover the
cost of those pharmaceuticals for its patients-may be the preferred tool for
bringing down the cost of pharmaceuticals, as well as for ensuring the efficacy
of newly developed drugs. 7 9 This solution is unlikely to face much opposition
in the United States. The CMS has been an established and accepted part of the
American regime for decades, whereas the HIF, in contrast, is a revolutionary,
yet-to-be implemented proposal.
Alternatively, significant cost-savings on healthcare spending may be realized
by converting Medicare from a service benefit program to a voucher
program. 80 However, even this change would require the general public's
recognition of the need for "fundamental reform" of the Medicare program, as
well as significant bipartisan cooperation to pass reform legislation.181

178 See id. at 14.
179 See Patsner,supra note 19, at 41-43 (discussing the shift in power in the relationship between

the FDA and CMS).
180 Nelson, supra note 32, at 231-32.
181 Id.
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D. STATEWIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND

Although it is unlikely that the U.S. will adopt the Health Impact Fund
nationwide, it is more likely that individual states could successfully participate
in the worldwide HIF, or alternatively, could adopt a statewide HIF model
within their own borders. Because the HIF model is likely to be highly
controversial on a nationwide scale, individual states-some of whose
constituents are more politically liberal-have a better chance of passing
controversial legislation statewide instead of vying for similar measures
This phenomenon may help to explain the passage of
nationwide.
Massachusetts' contentious health care reform in 2006.
If individual states were to subscribe to the worldwide HIF, they would have
to devise a way to pay into the fund before their citizens begin receiving the
This may be
benefit of at-cost prices for pharmaceutical products.
funding, the
federal
accomplished with or without federal funding. Without
burden to raise the revenue required for participation within the HIF would fall
largely upon the taxpayers within the particular state. Otherwise, the federal
government may grant funds for a specific state to participate, in which case the
tax-paying burden would be more evenly spread throughout the whole U.S.
(although the whole U.S. would not receive the benefits of the state's
participation in the HIF). The federal government could make grants to a
participating state contingent upon the program's success and might demand
repayment if the program realized extensive cost savings.
However, the alternative implementation of the HIF within individual states
would not be without its own complications. If a state experiences success
under the HIF program-that is to say, if it realizes cost-reduction of
pharmaceuticals for its consumers-out-of-state patients may be tempted to fill
their prescriptions within the HIF-participant state's borders. This closely
mirrors the complications of price discrimination among disparate countries,
which occurs when residents of Country A travel to neighbori'ng Country B to
purchase pharmaceuticals that are sold at a lower price in Country B than
Country A.182 This parallel importation problem could also apply between
different interstate transactions (i.e., between various U.S. states) as easily as it
applies between countries, such as Mexico, the U.S., and Canada.183

182
183

See HOLUS & POGGE, supranote 3, at 85.
Id
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States has experienced much success in implementing its
national patent protection system for pharmaceuticals. The U.S. has been the
worldwide leader in pharmaceutical innovation for the past several years, and
there is evidence that the patent system has fostered-and continues to
foster-the type of beneficial innovation that it seeks to promote.184
However, the patent system does not foster pharmaceutical innovation very
efficiently.s85 Instead, the patent system has contributed to the high cost of
pharmaceuticals and often incentivizes the developers of pharmaceuticals to
pursue goals that are socially suboptimal.186 As health care costs generally-and
pharmaceutical costs specifically-continue to rise, it is essential to explore
options for reforming or supplementing the traditional patent system for the
protection of pharmaceuticals. These options could help to bring down costs
while maintaining or improving the quality of pharmaceuticals.
Although it neither alters the structure of the patent system nor supplements
it with another system of intellectual property protection, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act does remedy some of the problems that inhere in the
patent system to a certain extent.8 7 The Act calls for increased research into a
therapy's comparative clinical effectiveness with the goal of reining in costs of
health care interventions while preserving or increasing the quality of those
interventions.' 88 However, a national sentiment which strongly opposes a
centralized, single-payer health care system-much like the ones found in
Western European countries-has been largely responsible for the installation
89
of tight restrictions on CMS's use of comparative effectiveness research.
Given these restrictions and the sentiments they reflect, it is highly unlikely that
the U.S. would opt to participate in a global implementation of the Health
Impact Fund, although participation could help decrease the financial burden
upon the U.S. that global disease poses, as well as poverty and disease of the
U.S.'s own impoverished populations.
Although the U.S. is not likely to implement the HIF system in the
foreseeable future-largely because of popular resistance-individual states
could experience success either by (1) participating in the global HIF program
should it come to fruition, or (2) creating their own intrastate HIF models to be
184 See Macher & Mowrey, supra note 26.
185 See HOLUiS & POGGE, supra note 3, at

85-88.

Id.
187 See Saver, supra note 21, at 437.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 439.
186
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used within and among other states, perhaps even in conjunction with other
countries, such as Canada and Mexico. As the Massachusetts health care
reform indicates, this sort of radical change is more likely to occur in a
statewide health care regime rather than at the national level because it is easier
for a state to act collectively to implement radical legislation than it is for the
entire U.S. Further, the statewide Medicaid programs, which serve a poorer
population that is more likely than the general population to benefit from HIFregistered drugs, may have greater incentives than does the general U.S. to
implement a HIF model. Although the HIF would be difficult to implement
nationwide, the proposal could prove instrumental in bringing the U.S. (or its
individual states) closer to an ideal pharmaceutical market as the country
continues to struggle with making health care effective, affordable, and
accessible to all.
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